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256 4.5 Underlying pollutant distribution assumption
257 We do not assume any underlying distribution and instead empirically estimate the 258 distribution of daily river N concentration using 10 years' continuous weather data.
259 Generating a large sample of river concentration under different regulatory policies provides 260 a more realistic approximation of the natural variability in the stochastic diffuse pollution 261 process (formation, transport and fate) in each catchment. This way we avoid any bias in the 262 ranking of regulatory instruments from imposing distributional assumptions about the 263 pollutant. We also compared the nonparametric kernel density of the empirical (modelled) 11 264 river concentration with an assumed normal, truncated normal and log-normal distribution 13 265 and report the results in section 5.5. Moreover, our methodology is also superior to imposing 266 a standard on the leachate in or below the root zone -a common assumption in the literature 267 due to the difficulty of modelling pollutant fate and transport to the receiving water body. It 268 also avoids having to convert the EU WFD nitrate standard (concentration -mg/L) into a 269 mass equivalent which requires making simplifying and distorting assumptions (Kampas and 270 . Nor do we assume that the distribution of the pollution load (mass -mg) in the 271 root zone approximates the distribution of N concentration in the river, which is likely to 272 distort instrument cost-effectiveness and policy ranking. Also, since our approach does not 273 involve approximating the deterministic equivalent of a probabilistic constraint in a chance 274 constrained programming framework, therefore we don't have to estimate the correlation 275 coefficient between emissions (Kampas and White, 2003) .
277 4.6 Economic modelling

278
(1) Minimise 
The parameters for the normal and lognormal distributions were estimated from the data's mean and the mean of the log, respectively, whereas those of the truncated normal over the interval of concentration greater that 2 mg/L (arbitrarily chosen) were obtained by maximum likelihood. The nonparametric density, which closely follows the data, was obtained using a normal kernel with a bandwidth of 0.5. Empirical frequency refers to the number of observations that exceed the standard.
14 Productive activity refers to crops, livestock production (grassland) and LR. 12 287 determines the social cost of regulation (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Beavis and Walker, 288 1983). If a policy achieves a particular RT at lower social cost than another policy, then it is 289 more cost-effective and in a second best world more efficient (Ribaudo et al., 1999 341 RT by ensuring at least 8% compliance at all times. Table 2 ranks each policy's relative cost-342 effectiveness and associated reduction in catchment profit relative to the catchment baseline.
343 The 10%, 5%, 3% and 1% RTs were arbitrarily chosen to illustrate the effect of progressively 344 stricter enforcement, with the 1% RT being the tightest. 418 44.23% and only 13.45% respectively at the 3% target. Intriguingly, the difference between 419 instrument levels required to achieve the same RT in both catchments is the smallest with 18 Compare the increased percentage reduction in the Brothock's resource profit using LR in moving from the 10% RT (-6.5) to the 1% RT (-36.94). 447 Farmers tend to apply fertilisers in fixed ratios or purchase fertiliser mixes containing N, P 448 and K in recommended ratios. Assuming this, the models estimate the application or load of 477 3MI, which has a smaller IT component, does not produce a spike in P consumption. This is 478 because at high N input prices it is more profitable to substitute away from winter wheat to 479 seed potatoes. Therefore, an unintended consequence of IT is that, while it reduces 480 catchment N consumption, it unfortunately provides a perverse incentive to shift from winter 481 wheat (NPK/ha ratio 200:70:70) to seed potatoes (NPK/ha ratio 90:200:150) -which requires 482 relatively less N but more P. Both P and N are nutrients that contribute to eutrophication and 483 achieving GECS. This highlights the risk of pollution swapping and the need to consider the 484 broader impact of policies as they may paradoxically provide perverse incentives that 485 produce detrimental water quality consequences from pollution swapping. 499 with similar characteristics can be identified. In this paper, we investigate the consistency of 500 policy cost-effectiveness across two relatively similar catchments. We account for the 501 stochastic nature of NP by empirically estimating the distribution of daily ambient river nitrate 502 concentration using 10 years of continuous weather data, without making distorting a priori 503 distributional assumptions. This provides a more realistic assessment of the uncertainty 504 associated with regulatory controls. Additionally, we estimate instrument cost-effectiveness 505 based on the distribution of river concentration as opposed to pollution loads (mass) in the 20 506 root zone. We contend that modelling the entire biophysical processes realistically and 507 imposing environmental standards at the point of environmental impact (river) is critical to 508 policy analysis. The significance of our results are in the detail, i.e., policy ranking is only just 509 broadly consistent, even in two relatively similar catchments. That is, the cost-effectiveness 510 ranking of policies is may not be as robust as policy makers would like.
511 Interestingly, policies tend to outperform in very distinct RT ranges -even though the 512 instrument levels required to meet RTs differ in catchments. Initial pollution reduction is most 513 cost-effectively achieved by IT, higher RTs required 2 instrument MIs, whereas the strictest 514 RTs require 3 instrument MIs. Thus indicating that cost-effective rankings are probably RT 515 dependent. Such distinct cost-effectiveness frontiers should make it easier to determine 516 optimal control policies for specific RTs. The presence of crossovers did not significantly alter 517 the ranking of policies or the identification of efficiency frontiers. Results confirm the previous 518 literature in that single instruments display efficient abatement fatigue at higher RTs and that 519 the relative cost-effectiveness of MIs improves as the RT is tightened.
520
521 A key result is that the difference between instrument levels required to achieve the same RT 522 in both catchments is the smallest with 3MI. Thus MIs are arguably more suited to being 523 applied as uniform policies across different catchments than IT. Interestingly, MIs also 524 display the least variation in catchment resource cost across RTs, implying it might easier to 525 raise environmental quality (higher RT) with a MI policy. The standard deviation of river 526 pollution under MIs is also less than IT in both catchments. In considering the impact of 527 policies to control diffuse N pollution on farm P and K consumption our results suggest that 528 IT does significantly reduce P and K consumption, but LR and SDR do not. However, at the 529 strictest RT, IT produced perverse land allocation incentives that may produce spikes in the 530 consumption of P and K. Another benefit of MIs was the absence of such spikes. It is 531 apparent that there are trade-offs between policies to control NP and the consumption of P 532 and K, which in turn can paradoxically prevent meeting GECS -providing another reason to 533 coordinate policy across pollutants. Admittedly consumption of P & K is a proxy for pollutant 534 loads entering the river and future research would benefit from modelling P and K river 21 535 concentrations or better yet ecological impact. Whilst in a sense a favourable case has been 536 considered here (i.e. relatively comparable catchments in geographical proximity), the results 537 suggest that an overall consistent ranking is found across policy instruments. Unfortunately, 538 it may not be as as robust as regulators and stakeholders would like or assume. Differences 539 in the absolute level of instruments across catchments are considerable but intuitively 540 correct. Ideally policy packages should be tailored to specific catchments, as the efficiency 541 gains are theoretically considerable -however real world transaction costs may render this 542 infeasible at present. 559 The paper investigates the transferability of instruments to control NP by comparing the cost-560 effective ranking of regulation in two relatively similar agricultural catchments. We use an 561 approach, which does not necessitate making a priori assumptions about the underlying 562 distribution of daily stochastic pollutant concentration in rivers. Our results suggest that policy 563 instrument ranking is broadly but not convincingly consistent across relatively similar 22 564 catchments but that policies outperform in distinct regulatory target ranges. Notably we find 565 that MI policies display characteristics more suitable to wider application across catchments 566 (especially at higher RTs), the enforcement of stricter RTs over time and where there are 567 ecological concerns about pollution swapping and the consumption of other polluting 568 nutrients.
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571 Black for their help. 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25 The modelling of river flow and nitrate concentrations was done using a version of the The flow routing methodology is based upon an exponential model of the drainage from a non-linear catchment soil water store or reservoir, as derived by Kirkby (1975) , in which the instantaneous rate of discharge from the store is calculated as:
where Q t is the rate of discharge at time t, Q 0 is the rate of discharge when the soil store is saturated, S t is the catchment soil moisture store, and M is the master recession constant, representing the rate at which the soil store empties and hence the recession of the river hydrograph.
The store is representative of an exponential decline in lateral transmissivity of the soil with depth (Beven et al., 1994) . Thus, the change of the rate of discharge is nonlinear with respect to the rate of change of the catchment store. This nonlinear description The BFI is used to parameterise M in the EveNFlow system, following studies of hydrograph index variability that have demonstrated that BFI is more stable than Q 95 , and that the BFI for individual years are consistently close to the long-term value except in years of extreme drought (Gustard et al., 1987) .
The total flow from a catchment is calculated by area weighting of the sum of rapid and slow soil drainage derived flows for each soil area within the catchment. The methodology described above separates the river hydrograph into components derived from rapid and slow drainage. To simulate mixed nitrate concentrations, the EveNFlow stores were then paired with nitrogen stores. For each store, the nitrogen in storage was increased daily by the quantities in the rapid or slow drainage, as appropriate. The nitrogen in the stores was assumed to be mixed perfectly in the volumes of water held by the EveNFlow stores. Hence, nitrogen was removed from the stores and input to the modelled rivers each day, in proportion to the ratio of the predicted total discharge from and current volume of water in the stores. where K is an empirical retention parameter, T is the daily average air temperature, and V is the river velocity, calculated according to the methodology of Round et al. (1998) . 
